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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of non-bank financial institutions in processes of financial 
policy reform and institutional development and the implications of their operations for the 
sequencing of such reforms. It distinguishes among non-bank financial organizations that result 
from upward-looking or downward-looking innovations and those that reflect regulatory 
avoidance. First, upward-looking innovations to respond to specific demands require the develop-
ment of a complex institutional infrastructure. Second, absence of competitive neutrality in the 
regulatory framework leads to avoidance: off-balance-sheet liabilities, off-shore operations, and 
parallel markets. Third, downward-looking innovations are needed to expand the financial frontier 
toward marginal clientele. This requires solutions to important information, risk, and incentive 
problems. Various types of non-bank organizations have been created for this purpose. There is 
a need for prudential regulation and supervision that is idiosyncratic and protects competitive 
neutrality, while at the same time avoids financial repression. 
NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SEQUENCING 
OF FINANCIAL REFORM1 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Bank and Non-Bank Intermediaries 
The general purpose of this conference has been to identify issues to be resolved and 
lessons learned concerning the most appropriate speed of adoption and the correct sequencing of 
financial policy reforms and the accompanying institutional development. Better policies and 
stronger institutions are needed to more efficiently provide financial services that contribute to 
improved resource allocation, greater macroeconomic stability, and more rapid rates of output 
growth. This paper is concerned, as well, with policy and institutional improvements that would 
facilitate access to financial services for much wider segments of the population in developing 
countries. 
So far, the focus of the conference has been on macroeconomic policy management, the 
performance of money markets and efficiency of the payments system, as well as privatization of 
financial and non-financial enterprises and the development of capital markets, mostly in emerging 
market economies. Attention has been paid, particularly, to the regulation and supervision of 
banks. This emphasis is quite appropriate. 
First, in a repressive policy framework or unstable macroeconomic environment, few 
(formal) financial institutions can flourish. Macroeconomic stability, low rates of inflation and, 
in particular, fiscal control are clearly prerequisites for successful financial reform (McKinnon, 
1991). Second, increased efficiency of the payments system is critical to reduce transaction costs 
in markets for goods and services, factors of production, and assets and to foster market 
1 Paper presented at the USAID/Brookings lnstitution/KPMG Peat Marwick "Conference on 
Sequencing Financial Sector Development and Reform: Major Themes and Issues," held in 
Washington, D.C. on October 3-4, 1994. The style of the oral presentation is preserved. 
2 Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at The Ohio State University, 
Director of the Rural Finance Program. Research in this area has been funded over the years by 
the USAID Financial Resources Management (FIRM) Cooperative Agreement with Ohio State. 
The author is grateful to Alison Harwood and J.D. Von Pischke for the invitation to write this 
paper and to conference participants for comments. 
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integration. Banks are important precisely because their performance is closely linked to the effi-
ciency of the payments system. 
Moreover, because monetary assets (the liabilities of the banking system) dominate the 
financial portfolios of (non-bank) savers, particularly in developing economies, banks represent 
the most important source of funding of investment and of productive activities, in general, 
beyond the owned savings or retained earnings of most enterprises, at least in the formal sector. 
Thus, banks matter a lot because of their key role in providing both monetization and 
intermediation services to the economy. Third, the emergence of strong banks will be critical for 
economic progress in countries in transition from command to a market allocation of resources. 
The development of stable banking systems in those economies will not be a trivial task, however, 
particularly given an incomplete organizational framework (Caprio and Levine). 
In turn, bank regulation and supervision matter because of the potential negative ex-
ternalities associated with bank failures (Kaufman). In the absence of regulation, bank instability 
may actually be higher than is socially optimum, and the volume of deposit contracts may decline. 
These contracts provide, given asymmetric information in financial markets, occasion for the op-
portunistic behavior of bank managers and owners at the expense of depositors. Such market 
imperfections (moral hazard and externalities), combined with the breakdown of feasible collective 
action by depositors, in order for them to sufficiently constrain the behavior of banks, on the one 
hand, and with limitations of the institutional framework in offering effective tools for corrective 
action, on the other hand, provide the rationale for state intervention in the prudential (i.e., pre-
ventive) regulation and supervision of banks and other deposit-taking institutions (Chaves and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
The emphasis this conference has placed on banks has been, therefore, quite appropriate. 
The question addressed in this paper, however, is: what about non-bank financial institutions? 
What role should they play in processes of financial reform and institutional development? What 
are the implications of their emergence and operations for the sequencing of reforms and institu-
tional development efforts? 
A relevant discussion of these questions requires a distinction among three types of non-
bank financial organizations, according to their origin: 
(a) those resulting from upward-looking financial innovations; 
(b) those resulting from regulatory avoidance; and 
(c) those resulting from downward looking financial innovations. 
While upward-looking innovations lead to a more sophisticated financial system, catering 
to the advanced needs of large commercial firms and wealthy investors, as income grows and the 
economy becomes more diversified, downward-looking innovations bring into the formal system 
clientele so far left out of the supply of basic financial services, thus expanding the frontier of the 
system (Von Pischke). In addition, market participants subject to repressive regulation invent 
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(rather than innovate), in order to pursue new and unregulated financial activities that are not simi-
larly taxed, but that would not be competitive in the absence of financial repression (Kane, 1977). 
This leads to institutional growth through regulatory avoidance. 
II. Upward-Looking Innovations 
As Levine described for this conference (following Goldsmith), there are predictable 
patterns of development of financial market structures (King and Levine). As income levels 
increase, the size of the domestic market grows, and development of the country's institutional 
infrastructure allows the design and enforcement of more complex contracts, the operation of new, 
non-bank, specialized intermediaries, such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
investment banks, venture capital funds, and the like becomes possible and responds to widening 
demands for risk-return combinations. With the emergence of these new types of financial organi-
zation, the structure of the financial system becomes increasingly complex and diversified. 
While these new non-bank financial organizations play increasingly important roles in the 
selection (screening) of projects for funding and in the monitoring of firms and their managers, 
as well as in facilitating the acceptance and management of risk in the economy, they must rely 
on a relatively advanced degree of organizational development. They can only operate if the legal 
structures, institutional mechanisms (including appropriate regulatory frameworks), and informa-
tion processes required are available. For this reason, they are usually in the future rather than 
the present of financial policy reform and institutional development, particularly in the thin 
markets of either the low-income developing countries or economies in transition. Thus, I tend 
to agree with Stiglitz (1993a), when he makes similar considerations about the development of 
equity markets, which can be expected to play only a minor role in raising funds for firms and in 
providing relevant information for investment decisions in transition economies and small develop-
ing countries. 
The authorities must eventually anticipate, nevertheless, the emergence of these non-bank 
financial institutions, by contributing to the development of the organizational infrastructure that 
is essential for their efficient operation and, in particular, by adopting the regulatory framework 
and enforcement mechanisms needed to prevent fraud and avoid unnecessary instability. These 
measures, related to upward-looking financial innovations, would come late, however, in the se-
quencing of institution building efforts. They would not be a priority for foreign assistance, at 
least in the short run. Rather, in developing countries and economies in transition, such assistance 
should mostly focus on building better banks. The nature of the actions required for this task has 
been a topic competently analyzed by other participants in this conference. For this reason, I will 
not discuss these issues any further here. 
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Ill. Regulatory A voidance 
A second set of observed non-bank financial institutions are the outcome of regulatory 
avoidance efforts, in the presence of repressive policies and mandated constraints on financial in-
termediary operations. Financial repression encompasses all forms of regulation that distort finan-
cial markets and reduce the efficiency of their performance (Shaw; McKinnon, 1973). The pur-
pose of these regulations is typically to tax (or subsidize) financial transactions or to influence re-
source allocation by setting constraints on financial transactions. 
Repressive interventions include collection of the inflation tax, credit subsidies, mandatory 
credit allocations and targeted loans, confiscatory reserve requirements, overvaluation of the 
domestic currency, and excessive restrictions to entry into the market. Efforts to alter financial 
market solutions through coercive regulation induce responses in the form of inventions, to avoid 
the initial regulation or its consequences. These innovations may take the form of new products 
and services, may lead to product substitution, or may result from the emergence of new 
intermediary types (Kane, 1977).3 
Regulatory avoidance is particularly intense when regulation is partial and/or non-neutral. 
The competitive neutrality of any regulatory framework is required in order to provide a level 
playing field to all market participants. Such neutrality would allow them to exploit their specific 
comparative advantages without hindrance (increased efficiency), and would also minimize efforts 
of regulatory avoidance triggered by any discriminatory treatment (such as when some intermedi-
aries are taxed or subject to reserve requirements and others are not). 
In the presence of repressive and non-neutral regulatory frameworks, avoidance may have 
several of the following consequences: 
(a) First, it may lead to the undertaking of non-regulated activities by otherwise regulated 
institutions. 
Thus, for example, if reserve requirements on deposits are excessive, banks may design 
new quasi-deposit instruments (e.g., fideicomisos or funds in trust) not subject to such require-
ments, thus undermining the original intent of the regulator. In other cases, given constraints on 
loan transactions, these non-regulated activities may lead to the accumulation of off-balance sheet 
3 Repressive regulation also induces rent-seeking and other costly but not directly productive 
activities, aimed at attracting privileges or avoid implicit taxes (Gonzalez-Vega and Mesalles). 
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and other contingent liabilities.4 This behavior may increase risk in the system and complicate the 
enforcement of capital adequacy requirements. 
In Ecuador in the early 1980s, for example, constraints on interest rate determination and 
other regulatory measures (reserve requirements) repressed domestic funds mobilization and led 
domestic banks to guarantee loans by foreign banks rather than to lend themselves. When they and 
their clients were not able to face the accompanying foreign exchange risk, soon after a major de-
valuation a massive bailout by the Central Bank was needed, with substantial quasi-fiscal costs 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1994a). 
Recently, prudential regulation in Latin Amenca has attempted to follow the norms of the 
Basel Convention. These norms include capital adequacy requirements, computed on the sum of 
the weighted risk amount of assets and off-balance-sheet contingency accounts, multiplied by a 
capital adequacy factor. If banks are reluctant to increase their capital base, they will attempt to 
maintain few of the assets subject to the highest risk weights (e.g., loans). In order to avoid in-
creased capital contributions, moreover, banks may adopt policies that unintendedly increase their 
risk, with little opportunity for the authorities easily to recognize it. 
The challenge for the regulator is to design risk weights that lead to appropriate (pruden-
tial) capital requirements without inducing distorting unanticipated risk-taking. This purpose is 
not always achieved. Gomez (1994) has shown that in Ecuador, adoption of a three- percent 
capital requirement on the current loan portfolio, a five-percent requirement on the off-balance-
sheet contingency accounts, and a 100-percent requirement on accrued interest made it more 
attractive for banks to provide clients with a guarantee on a loan from a third party than to grant 
a direct loan. 5 This inclination was accentuated by very high reserve requirements on domestic 
deposits. As a result, the four largest banks of Ecuador had off-balance sheet contingency accounts 
between 102 and 310 percent of their loan portfolio. These loan guarantees are high-risk contin-
gent liabilities when denominated in foreign currency, as they were in Ecuador, if the bank must 
4 Off-balance-sheet activities categorize formal and informal commitments that generate con-
tingent claims against a financial institution's resources. They are typically agreements to provide 
or to guarantee credit and to deliver various other customer services on a standby basis. Because 
these agreements are offered contingently, generally accepted accounting principles do not require 
associated claims to be valued and entered on balance sheets of the contracting parties. Although 
accountants have designated the associated claims as off-balance-sheet items, economic analysis 
must consider them coequal elements of an institution's generalized or market-value balance sheet 
(Kane, 1985). Thus, although off-balance sheet liabilities may no affect the intermediary's balance 
sheet at present, they may generate a claim on its assets in the future. Thus, they represent actual 
contractual obligations that imply risks and that might trigger insolvency overnight. 
5 Part of the reason is that this requirement is sensitive to nominal interest rates, which rise 
with inflation. 
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disburse the funds immediately to honor the guarantee and has taken a foreign-exchange risk in 
its commitment. Eventually, a major devaluation placed these banks in the position of not being 
able to honor the guarantees granted. 
(b) Second, regulatory avoidance may lead to the establishment of off-shore operations, owned 
by domestic financial intermediaries, which allow them to locate some of their activities 
beyond the jurisdiction of the local regulatory framework, in order to avoid its (repressive 
or prudential) rules and constraints. 
In the case of Costa Rica, for example, it has been estimated that while off-balance sheet 
liabilities that substitute for regular deposits account for 15 percent of the banks' productive as-
sets, their off-shore operations are at least of the same size as their domestic operations (Camacho-
Mejia and Gonzalez-Vega). Not only is regulation in these off-shore sites less constraining, which 
may in some cases be a source of concern, but the mixing of domestic-regulated and off-shore-
unregulated operations massively complicates the task of prudential supervision in the home 
country of the banks. 
For example, the information contained in the financial statements of the domestic banks 
does not always provide a full picture of their true risk exposure, as the banks arbitrarily mix, 
add, or omit records, from one to the other operation. Frequently they attempt to charge most of 
the combined fixed costs to the operations of the domestic headquarters, but accrue most (uncon-
strained) earnings at the off-shore subsidiary. In these circumstances, financial ratios and other 
indicators mean little for prudential supervision tasks. In this connection, Costa Rica is not an ex-
ception among countries saddled by financial repression, where banks have found ways of relocat-
ing the site of their operations to avoid the implicit tax. 
(c) Third, initiatives for regulatory avoidance may lead to the establishment of non-regulated 
intermediaries in parallel domestic financial markets. 
In the mid-1980s, for example, we were able to identify close to 1,000 unregulatedfinan-
cieras and other non-bank intermediaries, operating side by side with over two dozen regulated 
banks (and frequently closely linked to them), just in the city of Santo Domingo, in the Dominican 
Republic (Gonzalez-Vega and Zinser). This was a dramatic example of the exit (Laffer) effects 
associated with excessive regulation. Continued attempts to regulate the financial sector, each time 
more strictly, progressively resulted in a shrinking regulated segment of the market and in less 
(rather than more) control by the authorities. 
The emergence of these unregulated parallel markets helped, however, to alleviate the 
negative consequences of financial repression. They kept in Santo Domingo deposits that would 
have otherwise migrated to New York (thus preventing capital flight) and supplied loans to margi-
nal clientele displaced from the shrinking portfolios of the regulated banks (thus offsetting some 
of the negative distributional consequences of disintermediation). Depositors as well as intermedi-
aries required higher risk premiums in these non-regulated markets, however. This and high trans-
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actions costs of searching for depositors and for borrowers and of monitoring for lenders substan-
tially increased the total cost of borrowed funds in these market segments. Thus, parallel markets 
did not necessarily look like the efficient curb markets of the neo-structuralist world (Dauhajre). 
In the presence of the resulting high real rates of interest, adverse selection effects became im-
portant and portfolio risks increased. In the absence of prudential supervision, opportunistic beha-
vior flourished. Eventually, flight by night by some financiera owners caused a domino effect, 
leading to a collapse of the parallel market and even to failure of some regulated banks, with close 
links to non-regulated intermediaries. 
The universally observed negative consequences from widespread financial repression 
suggest that inappropriate regulation may frequently be more dangerous than no regulation at all, 
even when theoretical reasons for intervention exist {Besley; Gonzalez-Vega, 1994c). What really 
matters are the actual effects of regulation, not merely its objectives. Too often good intentions 
of not-well-designed regulations are eclipsed by their more powerful unintended evils (Adams, 
Graham, and Von Pischke; Kane, 1977; Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). Moreover, highly effective 
supervision efforts, directed at making sure that repressive restrictions are enforced, reduce rather 
than increase social welfare. Indeed, when supervision of the financial system is used to enforce 
repressive regulation and it is successful in deterring regulatory avoidance, the potential damage 
is greater (Gonzalez-Vega and Mesalles). The solution, therefore, is not to enforce the rule more 
effectively , but to eliminate the original financial repression. When this is not possible, regulatory 
avoidance would usually be better than strict compliance with the repressive mandates. 
IV. Competitive Neutrality 
Prudential (as different from repressive) regulation attempts to promote stability and 
efficiency, by constraining the opportunistic actions of financial intermediaries and contributing 
to the safety and soundness of the banking system (Bengston et al.). Prudential efforts also attempt 
to protect (small) depositors against fraud or failure. Non-distorting prudential regulation relies 
on mandates of a general nature, inducing (mostly through compatible incentives) all market par-
ticipants to adhere to standard rules that protect the stability of the system. 
From this perspective, therefore, as repressive financial regulation is dismantled in 
developing countries and prudential supervision is adopted instead, it is important that the 
authorities strive to achieve, very early in the process, competitive neutrality, in the sense that 
instruments and/or financial organizations that are essentially the same, do receive equal treatment 
within the new regulatory apparatus. The regulatory environment must provide all market players 
with a level playing field (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). If, on the contrary, particular 
intermediaries are granted artificial advantages (as a result, for example, of their different charter 
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names, ownership, structure, or client orientation), not only will allocative efficiency be reduced, 
but regulatory avoidance will be encouraged. 6 
In addition, because of the inevitability of both frequent financial innovations and 
regulatory avoidance, the regulatory framework should not be static. Rather, it should quickly 
respond to changes in financial products and in market structure, in order to protect dynamic 
efficiency. Technological change spreads rapidly in financial markets, as both product and process 
innovations are easily replicated by competitors. Financial products are openly available and 
typically not protected by patent. Processes are copied through the mobility of employees and fre-
quently require only widely available technologies (telecommunications, computers). Prudential 
regulation and supervision must keep up with these changes, pushing their authority beyond 
banks, to include non-bank intermediaries. The process of institutional reform in the regulatory 
arena must anticipate these increasing pressures on the supervisory agency and provide it with 
adequate tools and powers (Camacho-Castro and Gonzalez-Vega). 
Moreover, prudential regulation becomes increasingly less effective in the presence of 
regulatory avoidance, unless the regulators respond rapidly in order to close the loopholes created 
by invention. This is a difficult task, because regulators tend to react more slowly than the 
organizations that they supervise. Thus, in this process of regulatory dialectic (regulation, 
avoidance, re-regulation) the authorities tend to lag behind (Kane, 1977). The mix of political and 
economic incentives that governs the behavior of government bureaucrats greatly lengthens the 
inevitable lag of examiner recognition behind the true importance of emerging forms of yet-to-be-
regulated risk (Kane, 1985). Regulatory lags amplify incentives for market participants to invent 
and pursue new forms of risk. The supervisory agency must be allowed to operate, therefore, with 
much flexibility. 
In this sense, a simplistic concept of sequencing is inappropriate. Rather than the once-and-
for-all placement of specific building blocks, effective prudential regulation and supervision (a 
critical component of a successful financial reform) are continuing processes, moving along with 
the evolution of market forces, technological innovation, and organizational structures. Institu-
tional development is not about "this first and that next," but about the evolution of a broadly-
based set of inter-related components. 
6 Allocative efficiency requires that available resources flow to the financial organizations that 
offer the highest expected risk-adjusted rates of return. Regulation should not be used to promote 
the achievement of "social" objectives or to assist particular sectors of the population for reasons 
not related to the services of financial intermediation per se. 
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V. Downward-Looking Innovations 
Some of the most interesting and challenging issues of financial reform and regulation and 
of financial institution development concern the promotion of downward-looking innovations. 
Here I refer to the provision of financial services to individuals (households and firms) located 
at what Von Pischke has called the frontier; that is, those economic agents not usually considered 
as creditworthy by formal financial institutions. Rather than creating increasingly sophisticated 
financial arrangements upstream, innovation in this case enlarges financial markets by serving new 
market niches downstream, responding to basic demands by clientele not yet reached by institu-
tional finance. This task, for some not as glamorous as the development of capital markets or fi-
nancial derivatives, and easily populated by romantic utopians, is nevertheless important and 
equally difficult. Foreign assistance to developing countries and economies in transition should 
concentrate efforts in this area. 
Initiatives to move the frontier outward, further expanding and integrating financial 
markets, may come from two sources (Von Pischke): 
(a) Pressure may come from entrepreneurial intermediaries and investors (innovators) that 
attempt to leap the frontier and bring formal financial services to clientele who have not 
used them before; their innovations improve risk management and reduce transaction 
costs, creating opportunities for profitable financial intermediation in new market niches. 
These innovators may include exceptional bankers, willing to reach downward into new 
market segments, or emerging non-bank organizations that can generate comparative 
advantages in supplying financial services to difficult clientele. 
(b) Pressure may also come from government (and/or donor) intervention, either directly, by 
providing financial services to specific target groups through state-owned banks or non-
government organizations (NGOs), or by indirectly requiring existing financial inter-
mediaries to lend to those clientele. Government actions may also contribute to this goal 
by improving the organizational framework (physical and institutional infrastructure) that 
facilitates the task of financial intermediaries in reaching clientele at the frontier, by pro-
moting research and development in financial technologies, or by capitalizing organiza-
tions ready to accept the challenge. 
Some guidance in understanding the complexities of this task may be obtained from a brief 
review of the history of targeted financial market interventions. The prevalence of failed attempts 
at influencing prices and quantities of financial transactions by decree suggests that it may be 
better to work with, rather than against, financial market forces (Kane, 1984; Von Pischke). 
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VI. Financial Market Interventions 
In the 1950s, particularly in the rural areas of developing countries, the finance "problem" 
was defined as: 
(a) a generalized lack of access to formal, institutional credit; coupled with 
(b) too high and dispersed rates of interest in informal credit transactions; and 
(c) some limited degree of access to mostly short-term and small informal loans, seen as not 
a good vehicle to finance productive investment. 
At that time, these patterns were diagnosed mostly as a reflection of two types of market 
failure: 
(a) first, they were attributed to something vaguely described by the statement that 
"commercial banks are too conservative," a caution which might have been due to in-
formation and enforcement problems (although in the 1950s we were still a long way from 
Stiglitz and Weiss), in addition to the presumed "risk aversion" of formal lenders (which 
was seen as either "irrational" or "socially undesirable"), and 
(b) second, they appeared to reflect the excessive monopoly power of moneylenders.7 
In most developing countries, the typical policy answers to these "problems" and to the 
"failure" or markets to provide financial services to politically preferred clientele were: 
(a) the creation of government-owned specialized (such as agricultural) development banks, 
and 
(b) the establishment of subsidized, targeted credit programs. 
These interventions became prominent in the strategies of financial repression that current 
financial reforms are attempting to turn around. Their failure illustrates the shortcomings of 
inappropriate government intervention in financial markets (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham). 
Looking back, such presumed sources of market failure were not the only possible reason 
for the patterns of rural finance observed. Both lack of access to formal credit and the high costs 
and short terms of informal loans may have also resulted from an incomplete organizational frame-
work. That is, they would easily reflect the high transaction costs required to overcome the 
7 In the presence of imperfect intertemporal markets, given information asymmetries, initially 
unequal allocations of assets (e.g., land) may have long-lasting adverse consequences on efficiency 
and growth through their implications for individuals' ability to accumulate physical and human 
capital (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Government policies to deal with these problems have 
aggravated, however, rather than alleviated the credit rationing of the poor (Gonzalez-Vega, 1976; 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). 
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"frictions" that result in any market from an inadequate physical infrastructure or an incomplete 
institutional framework (Myint). Among typical shortcomings of the organizational framework 
that limit opportunities for financial transactions would be inappropriate definitions of property 
rights and absence of effective mechanisms for contract design and enforcement. Limited 
development of the physical infrastructure would also increase the costs of gathering information 
and monitoring the actions of agents (e.g., borrowers). 
Moreover, recently elegant economic theory has emphasized market failure again. Market 
imperfections would result mostly from asymmetric information and from opportunistic behavior 
that leads to moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Stiglitz and Weiss; Rashid and 
Townsend). We are a long distance away, however, from being able to use such theoretical results 
to recommend robust classes of widespread government intervention and to identify feasible 
instruments for such intervention (Besley). Furthermore, now we understand much better the high 
costs of government failure and of the associated rent-seeking and other not directly productive 
(DUP) activities that are encouraged by protectionist interventions (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). 
Knowledge of the administrative difficulties and of political economy scenarios for state activities 
should make us extremely cautious in recommending new forms of government intervention in 
order to reach marginal clientele. 
Thus, to the question of what explains lack of access to financial services by marginal 
clientele there are some alternative answers: 
(a) the problem may be due to the presence of market imperfections that must be corrected, 
typically with a particular tax-cum-subsidy (quasi-fiScal) intervention or with some planned 
(administrative rather than a market) allocation of resources (i.e., the protectionist 
explanation), 8 or 
(b) there may be cost-effective opportunities for improved allocations of resources, to be 
achieved by further development of the country's physical and institutional infrastructure 
(i.e., the institutional economics explanation). 
The development of the required organizational framework may still be a critical function 
for the state, essentially in the provision of public goods, rather than in interfering with the 
pricing of or in the direct allocation of credit. This implies a different view of the role of the state 
in processes of economic development. 
8 An alternative intervention, grounded in modern theory but still unfeasible, would be 
effective mechanism design that would offer a cost-effective solution to the information and 
incentive problems involved. 
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VII. The Finance Problem 
A more productive undertaking would be to attempt a better understanding of the 
fundamental nature of the (access to) finance problem. Beyond Von Pischke's frontier, in the 
developing countries there are some economic agents with wealth but not attractive additional 
(marginal) investment opportunities of their own and, particularly, large numbers of agents with 
unexploited opportunities, but not sufficient owned funds to fully take advantage of them. The 
challenge of financial intermediation is to match those "with money but no projects" to those 
"with projects but no money." 
Institutional solutions to this problem typically involve transforming illiquid projects into 
liquid claims (possibly through a chain of intermediaries, which bridge the gap by offering 
liabilities that are more liquid than their own assets). In this process of transformation, problems 
emerge when borrowers are unable to repay (as when they experience a negative shock) or are 
unwilling to repay (when it is not optimal for them to do so). In this last case, the market requires 
a framework for cost-effective legal enforcement of the contract. In the absence of the required 
institutional infrastructure, costs of enforcement may be too high and potential borrowers would 
not have access to formal loans. 
In addition, any lender's supply of credit to a particular borrower depends upon the 
possession of enough information about the borrower's reliability and about the nature of the 
productive opportunity being financed. In the absence of sufficiently good enough information, 
the loan will not be granted, because uncertainty about repayment will be too high. If, in addition, 
information is asymmetric, there are opportunities for moral hazard. Individuals who have already 
borrowed may slacken in efforts needed to make the project successful or may change the nature 
of the project, making it riskier. Because of fears that tf'l;,, may happen, lenders need to monitor 
borrower behavior. If monitoring is too costly, they rna) .... ther restrict the amount of the loan or 
not lend at all. Furthermore, if higher interest rates attract riskier borrowers, such adverse 
selection problems may induce lenders not to use interest rates as a rationing device and to engage 
in credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss). 
When this is the case, economic agents may be capital constrained; they may be excluded 
from investing, even though they could technologically undertake a project with positive net 
present value (Holmstrom). One possible solution to this problem is to use collateral: that is, the 
pledge of proven, more liquid assets, about which there is more knowledge and less asymmetric 
information and/or mechanisms for foreclosure exist that allow for cost-effective contract 
enforcement. Thus, in collateral-based lending, the liquidation value of the agent's assets, which 
is typically less than their value in the continued use by the agent, may restrict the amount of 
investment that the agent can undertake. If project assets are limited and not liquid, there may be 
no investment. This lending technology relies on the availability of collateralizable assets, within 
a well-defined structure of property rights, given cost-effective institutions for contract enforce-
ment. It also implies the existence of markets where the value of such assets can be established. 
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Few of these preconditions may be present for marginal clientele in developing or transition 
economies. 
An alternative solution is to find a financial intermediary that has private information 
about the agent or about the line of business and/or that can monitor the agent more effectively 
(information-based lending). Thus, agents with insufficient own (liquid) assets (collateral) will 
either not be able to invest or will have to find access to more information-intensive sources of 
funds, which in general would tend to be more expensive, but may be their only option. This will 
be the case, not only for the poor in developing countries, but also for numerous new and small 
firms in transition economies, where information is scarce and uncertain and the institutional 
infrastructure for contract enforcement is still missing. Moreover, most regulatory frameworks 
have been built around collateral-based lending technologies. In order to incorporate new clientele 
within the frontier, regulatory frameworks will have to be adapted to inforrnation-(character)-
based lending. 
VID. Informal Lenders, Banks, and Non-Bank Intermediaries 
Pervasive informal financial arrangements have been partially successful in overcoming 
information, incentive, and enforcement problems and in supplying a narrow range of specific 
financial services to the poor in developing countries. Informal financial markets rely on highly 
information-intensive lending technologies. Repayment-relevant information and opportunities for 
monitoring are obtained by local informal lenders at low marginal cost through their daily 
interactions with potential borrowers in their proximity. This information is a sunk cost for 
moneylenders, who offer valuable services to their clientele. Non-institutional mechanisms for 
contract enforcement, mostly based on the value of reputation, in personalized market settings, 
contribute to the existence of informal financial transactions. 
Despite their valuable contributions, however, informal financial arrangements suffer from 
many limitations. These shortcomings stem from the very features that make them competitive: 
they are grounded in the community and are thus limited by the wealth constraints and the 
covariant risks of the local economy. As a result, their frontier is narrow and they do not go far 
in scope: geographically, over time, and across products. Informal arrangements provide only 
some financial services, in small amounts, for short periods of time. In many instances, they are 
not good vehicles for long-term investment. More importantly, because they are cost effective 
only in the immediate neighborho<Xl, they do not overcome market segmentation and do not 
contribute much to the most important function of finance: the integration of markets. For this 
critical task, formal finance with a national scope would be required (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994b). 
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As the "Conference on Financial Services and the Poor" demonstrated, much technological 
progress has taken place in the area of microfinance. 9 The key in order to reach marginal clientele 
is to design (public or private) "innovations" properly dimensioned to the size of the market and 
compatible with the nature of the clientele. Traditional banking technology, for example, is 
prohibitively expensive most of the time in dealing with the poor. Both lender and borrower 
transaction costs are too high in this case. Banks may adopt, however, more information-intensive 
technologies, in their downgrading strategies to reach new clients (Krahnen and Schmidt). This 
may include the restructuring of public development banks, to expand the scope of their operations 
(Gonzalez-Vega and Graham). 
Non-bank organizations (e.g., NGOs) may develop, in turn, comparative advantages in 
information and enforcement of contracts among these clientele, when contrasted with banks. 
They may be eventually upgraded to become banks or to mimic banks or in general to acquire 
some of the advantages of greater formality. In this case, they will be covered by the formal 
regulatory framework. Still another possibility is to allow the creation of entirely new types of 
financial institution. 
In each case, the challenge is to bring together those who have information and enforce-
ment advantages (usually local agents) and those with sufficient resources and a willingness to 
accept the risks of lending (frequently but not exclusively, governments and donors). This 
approach may generate, however, important new agency costs as governments, donors, apex 
organizations, or bank headquarters have to monitor the decentralized operations of branches, 
credit unions, village banks, NGOs, and the like (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1995). 
Moreover, in many cases of institutional development or transformation, it appears that 
an important dimension of the strategy would be to add a deposit mobilization dimension to the 
services supplied by the financial organization, both because of the intrinsic value of deposit 
services for the clientele (and the economy as a whole) as well as for the beneficial impact that 
the financial discipline of deposit mobilization brings to the intermediary. Deposit mobilization 
is critical to fully reap the benefits from financial intermediation, as it offers valuable services to 
savers (who typically exhibit a high demand for depositing facilities), and contributes to the 
viability of financial intermediaries. In other cases, public and/or donor funds are used in the 
capitalization of non-bank financial organizations, namely: 
(a) grant-equity or quasi-equity contributions to new or existing organizations, 
(b) shareholder participation in new intermediaries, or 
(c) the re-capitalization of government-owned banks. 
9 "Conference on Financial Services and the Poor: U.S. and Developing Country Ex-
periences," organized by the USAID Financial Sector Development Project and The Brookings 
Institution, in Washington, D.C., September 28-30, 1994. 
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IX. Idiosyncratic Regulation and Supervision 
Deposit taking introduces, however, threats to the stability of the financial system and 
raises issues of depositor protection, which must be resolved before introduction of this important 
financial service is encouraged. Prudential regulation and supervision are thus almost 
indispensable in the case of deposit-taking intermediaries, both for the protection of (small) savers 
from the opportunistic behavior or simply the financial incompetence of the organization's owners 
or managers and for the global protection of the system's stability (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 
1994). 
Internal control tools are also critical when the public sector is a (minority) shareholder 
in a private financial intermediary. Public sector shareholders in (mixed property) commercial 
banks need the means to exercise internal control and performance monitoring and the incentives 
to do it properly. This requires both understanding of the threats faced by the organization as well 
as the design of incentive-compatible terms of appointment. The same would be true of the boards 
of directors of NGOs and government-owned intermediaries. Accountability of public servants 
and mechanisms to enforce it are particularly relevant for government-owned agencies. Social-
interest considerations also justify the monitoring of public sector funds granted as equity or quasi-
equity contributions and as soft-term loans (e.g., through a second-tier rediscounting facility) to 
private and public financial organizations. 
Requirements for safe deposit taking as well as adequate vigilance of public sector funds 
may demand some form of government regulation and supervision. During the past decade there 
has been considerable progress in the design and implementation of new instruments, 
organizations, and criteria for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks (Vittas). The 
developed nations have adopted Basel Convention standards and several developing countries have 
gradually adapted them to their particular circumstances. Stronger superintendencies of banks have 
been created and upgraded in many countries (Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, and Indonesia, among others). 
Institution building is a long-term process, however, even for the prudential supervisor. 
In practice, therefore, many of the new superintendencies have encountered serious problems in 
implementation of new prudential rules, are frequently overburdened by their new responsibilities, 
and have only limited resources to complete their more demanding tasks. These complications 
militate against lending at the frontier and mobilizing the deposits of the poor. 
Both the downgrading of bank operations, for which they must adopt more-information-
intensive technologies, lend less against traditional collateral, and develop sources of local infor-
mation and enforcement, as well as the promotion and upgrading of non-bank organizations (such 
as credit cooperatives and other mutual intermediaries, NGOs that provide financial services, 
village banks and other collectively-owned local organizations) pose difficult questions, therefore, 
for the development of an appropriate prudential regulatory and supervisory framework. In 
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particular, traditional standards of prudential regulation may not be equally applicable, and new 
standards and examination methods must be designed. 
In instances of downgrading, some bank superintendencies have found it difficult to adjust 
their prudential criteria to cover loan portfolios not based on traditional collateral requirements. 
In implementing risk-weighted capital requirements, for example, they have tended to penalize 
loans not guaranteed by traditional collateral and/or based on screening tools that do not rely on 
audited financial statements. These prudential standards are linked to collateral-based lending, but 
are not appropriate for information-based lending. There is a need, therefore, to design specific 
prudential criteria that are both friendlier to lending to the poor and still offer appropriate 
protection to depositors and the stability of the financial system. 
On the one hand, in the case of risk-adjusted capital adequacy requirements for banks, su-
pervisors now rely extensively on the market value (liquidity) of traditional collateral. As lending 
technologies become more information intensive, when banks are downgraded, prudential super-
visors must learn to examine and evaluate portfolios based on character lending and on the close 
monitoring of borrowers, rather than on traditional collateral. This is as much a challenge to 
supervisors as it is to traditional bankers. 
On the other hand, if non-bank intermediaries are upgraded and, in particular, if they 
become deposit-taking institutions, this poses additional serious challenges to prudential regula-
tors. Chaves has raised serious questions about the impact on (institutional viability) of property 
rights structures, internal incentives, and governance rules of non-bank financial organizations 
sponsored by governments and donors in attempts to expand the frontier. This is not the place to 
discuss these agency problems in detail. Substantial issues for policy reform and regulation 
emerge, however, from the different organizational design of non-bank intermediaries. Safe 
deposit mobilization requires, among other things, idiosyncratic prudential regulation and 
supervision, to regulate different (bank and non-bank) intermediaries differently. Idiosyncratic 
risks arise, among other things, as a result of the institutional design of specific non-bank 
intermediaries. Some intermediary types possess a diffused ownership structure. Their design may 
cause "owners" not to provide an optimal amount of oversight of their operations (internal 
control). 
Therefore, bank superintendencies face adjustment problems in cases of upgrading as well. 
They find it difficult to recognize the need to offer idiosyncratic regulation for non-bank 
intermediaries and still maintain a level playing field, as required by competitive neutrality. Their 
examination tools have been appropriate for the traditional banking technology utilized by their 
main "customers," the private commercial banks. These tools, even applications of the well-
known CAMEL methodologies, are not easily adaptable to the peculiarities of non-bank 
intermediaries (e.g., credit unions, village banks, NGOs). Many non-bank organizations face 
different risks (such as subsidy dependence risk), with which bank examiners are not familiar. 
There is a need to design different early-warning indicators, because the structure of assets and 
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liabilities of the intermediary and the typical behavior of the clientele differ from traditional 
banking scenarios. 
Microfinance intermediaries come in a large variety of institutional designs and legal 
charters and function in very diverse economic and legal environments. The range of institutional 
designs, according to ownership, goes from financial intermediaries without specific owners (e.g., 
non-government organizations for particular purposes) to private commercial banks that have 
found an interesting market niche in the sector (e.g., BancoSol in Bolivia). Intermediate 
organizational arrangements are client-owned financial intermediaries (e.g., credit cooperatives 
and village banks), and state-owned banks and government organizations (e.g., Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia unit desa system and the Badan Kredit Kecamatan in Indonesia). 
Non-private financial organizations with no clearly defined owners (e.g., government-
owned development banks) do not generate the optimum levels of internal control expected from 
private owners. Insufficient internal control increases the risk of illiquidity or insolvency. 
Prudential supervisors have to be concerned, therefore, with additional questions that need not be 
addressed in the case of private commercial banks. The required new ski1ls and experience will 
take time to develop. 
Moreover, some of the traditional standards of prudential regulation, such as capital 
adequacy requirements and prohibition of related loans, may not make sense when there are no 
owners (NGOs) or may not be applicable when the owners are clients (credit unions). Capital 
adequacy requirements are probably the most important component of any regulatory framework, 
because of capital's key role in the operation of a financial intermediary. The most elementary 
definition of equity capital is the amount of money that is left for the owners of the intermediary 
in the event the organization is dismantled, after all creditors are paid off. Equity capital are 
liabilities that cannot be withdrawn at all by the owners and on which it should not be necessary 
to pay a fixed or contracted return. 
As such, capital plays two roles. The first one is the traditionally recognized function of 
buffer funds, to absorb losses on the income account. For moderate losses, capital would allow 
depositors to redeem their claims at full value. Nevertheless, due to high levels of debt relative 
to capital, on the liability side of depository intermediaries, capital does not represent a significant 
protection. This is because small losses, relatively to assets, may easily wipe capital out. 
The authentic function of capital in terms of depositor protection is to perform the role of 
a deductible (hostage), in the sense of an insurance policy. Equity capital is the amount that 
would be lost by the owners of the bank in the event of bankruptcy. The larger the deductible 
(i.e., expected owner losses), the more cautious the behavior of the intermediary (i.e., less risk 
assumed). In short, from a regulatory perspective, the main function of equity capital is to induce 
compatibility of incentives between the depositors and the owners of the intermediary and thereby 
reduce moral hazard. Given a sufficiently large deductible, the interests of owners and of deposi-
tors would be similar and the former would behave accordingly. 
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The nature of the incentives implied by each one of the institutional structures of non-bank 
intermediaries would lead to different behaviors in the presence of capital adequacy regulations. 
NGOs do not usually have a residual claimant of the profits (or losses) generated by their financial 
intermediation activities. This implies that incentive-compatible regulations must be designed that 
go beyond simple capital adequacy requirements, which are sufficient to exert the desired behavior 
from commercial private banks, but not from organizations "without owners." The resulting 
problems may be only partially solved by regulation. 
Credit cooperatives, on the other hand, do have owners. The problem here is that these 
owners behave according to their own (different) objective functions and create conflicts for the 
organization. These owners may find it privately profitable that the organization does not 
maximize its profits. This would be the case of net borrowers, whose payoffs from reduced or-
ganizational profits come at the expense of net savers. These conflicts may make these organiza-
tions particularly unstable (Poyo). The rivalry among owners also increases the risk of disintegra-
tion of the organization and creates increased opportunities for management to pursue its own 
interests. That is, client-owned financial intermediaries may be inherently more unstable and may 
suffer of larger principal-agent problems than other intermediaries under similar conditions.10 
The diversity of non-bank financial intermediaries is further compounded by the diversity 
of the economic and legal environments where they operate. This is exemplified by the fact that 
NGOs lend to microentrepreneurs in countries as dissimilar as The Gambia and Chile, where the 
degrees of development of the infrastructure, legal systems, human capital, and the financial 
market itself are at extreme opposites. In The Gambia, where there are no formal banks, the 
financial distress of some large NGOs may have important consequences for the economy at large. 
In the case of Chile, similar outcomes would be perceived only by those directly affected, without 
major macroeconomic implications. 
This diversity makes it impossible to provide a recipe that is easy to follow for the 
regulation of these organizations, while a generalized cost-benefit analysis for their regulation and 
supervision is impossible. Just as an example. the relative scarcity of the inputs necessary for 
regulation (e.g., trained bank examiners) changes the costs and benefits of supervision from 
country to country. 
The fact that idiosyncratic risks may call for differentiated regulation is not contradictory 
with the principle of competitive neutrality stated before. Equality of treatment is not assured by 
treating unequals equally. Rather, the idea is to allow for a diversity of organizations compatible 
10 Agency problems arise when the owner of some resources (principal) entrusts their 
management to another one (agent) who may have an objective function that does not necessarily 
coincide with that of the principal. The principal has to incur in monitoring and contract 
enforcement costs to guarantee that the agent behaves as desired. 
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with the multiple needs of the market, while at the same time assigning the regulatory burden with 
maximum efficiency (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
Many of these non-bank institutions are comparatively recent. As experience accumulates 
and it is interpreted from the perspective of the conceptual framework developed in this paper, 
useful empirical generalizations will be found. The topic is important, given the responsibility to 
protect poor clients who trust the organizations that mobilize their funds and grant them loans and 
the objective to promote healthy financial markets, where the niche of providing credit to small 
borrowers and depository services to small savers becomes sufficiently attractive. In particular, 
it would be important to avoid policy backlashes, which might result from the failure of intermedi-
aries that were not correctly regulated and supervised. Failures and policy backlashes would jeo-
pardize any progress in the achievement of the objective of improving access to financial services 
for small entrepreneurs at the frontier. 
X. Conclusion 
This paper has discussed issues concerning the role of non-bank financial institutions in 
processes of policy reform and institutional development. The distinction among three types of 
non-bank organizations has made it possible to explore the complexity of the tasks for the 
authorities. Of particular importance is a balance between competitive neutrality and idiosyncratic 
regulation, in order to promote a division of labor within the market that allows for full expression 
of comparative advantages in serving all potential market niches. 
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